Introduction
The hypothesis, or theory, that a product technology and the associated industry structure tend to have a life cycle first originated among business school scholars (see in particular Abernathy and Utterbach-1978) , but in recent years has been picked up by a number of economists (see for example Nelson-1994; Klepper-1996; and Malerba, Nelson, Orsenigo, Winter-1999) . Most versions of this theory posit that, when a technology is new, no version of it is completely satisfactory, many different firms try to produce and sell different variants, but none is able to achieve a large market.
In the early stages of the life cycle, there is considerable entry to the market both of firms and of customers, and a lot of exit as well. However with time, the technology stabilizes and so does industry structure, which generally becomes quite concentrated.
The versions of the theory that were articulated first stressed supply side dynamics. After a certain amount of experimentation, a version of the product is found or developed that satisfactorily meets the needs of a large block of customers. Customers gravitate to that version, which becomes the dominant design, and firms must produce that version if they are to survive. With the product market now more homogeneous, and design more stabilized, firms are able to take advantage of cumulative learning, scale intensive production methods become profitable and are adopted, entry becomes more difficult, and industry structure tends to concentrate. In some versions of this supply side theory, successful firms consolidate and advance their advantage by plowing their profits back into R-D.
More recently, there have been versions of this theory that stress demand side dynamics. A dominant design emerges and industry stabilization occurs not so much because a particular satisfactory technological mode is found, but rather because there are network economies or bandwagon effects on the demand side. Thus customers gravitate to a particular design, and firms must also if they are to survive. In most of the models stressing demand side dynamics, with the development of a dominant design industry structure tends to concentrate, just as in the models stressing supply side dynamics.
These theories are not mutually exclusive. In a number of industry histories, it is apparent that both supply-side dynamics and demand-side dynamics were at work and together led to increasing industry concentration.
Clearly not all technologies and industries display historical patterns that fit the life cycle story, and for many reasons. In the first place, many industries face a diverse set of customers and no single design ever emerges that satisfies all needs. Custom software is a good example. If one aggregates across different kinds of drugs, the pharmaceutical industry remains relatively unconcentrated because a variety of different types of drugs are needed to meet the diverse requirements of different humans with different ailments. (See e.g. Sutton, 1991 Sutton, , 1998 In some industries there would seem to be little in the way of economies of scale or cumulative learning advantages that would induce firms to grow large, and the productivity of large scale R-D is low.
The housing and trucking industries have always been fragmented.
It also is apparent that a number of industries that display dynamics that fit the broad technology and industry cycle theory over certain bounded periods of time, do not do so when a longer time horizon is considered. In particular, their technological histories are marked by a succession of different broad technologies, with one technology being dominant in one era, but then being succeeded by another technology that then is dominant for a while, and so on. Of particular interest, the firms that become dominant during one era often fail to hold their strong position after a new technology enters the picture. Rather, the new era belongs to new firms.
A considerable body of research and writing, a significant portion of it by economists, has developed and supported the argument that the effective transition to a new technology, and the changing of the locus of industrial leadership, are causally connected (Tushman and Anderson(1986) , Henderson and Clark(1990) , Christensen and Rosenbloom(1995) ). The dominant firms of one technological era often have great difficulty seeing the advantages of the new technology, or learn to use it effectively, and the development of that new technology, therefore, becomes the business of new firms to the industry.
In this essay, we pick up on these themes, and argue the following supplementary hypothesis.
The successful introduction of radically new technology in an industry, where a dominant design and a small collection of dominant firms had emerged using the older technology, may be dependent upon the presence of a group of experimental customers, or diverse preferences and needs among potential users, or both. If customers are not willing to experiment, and all potential customers have roughly the same tastes, the new firms that may be needed to introduce the new technology will not have enough of a market to stay around long enough to become viable. And there may be little pressure on established firms to adopt the new technology. Despite the opportunities afforded by a potentially powerful new technology, the industry will stay stuck with the old.
This hypothesis was virtually forced on us by our analysis of the evolution of computer technology and industrial structure (see Malerba-Nelson-Orsenigo-Winter, 1999) . The dramatic advances in computer performance that have occurred over the last forty years have been largely driven by a succession of major advances in component technologies. In no case has the firm that had market and technological leadership under one regime of components been the leader in developing and marketing computers employing the next generation of components. In each case, new firms were key players in the transformation of the technologies and the industry. And in each case, the new firms got their start selling to experimental users, or to users whose needs were inadequately met by computers based on the older component technology. We will argue there that there are many other industry histories that look like the computer case.
In Section II, we develop a simulation model of technology and industry dynamics in which there are a succession of potentially dominant technologies. Under any regime defined by a particular technology, there are forces that drive a technology and industry structure life cycle. There are dynamic increasing returns on the supply side and, in our base set of runs, network externalities or bandwagon effects on the demand side. Then along comes a potentially superior new technology, and some new firms that give it a try. To be successful, they need to pick up some customers pretty quickly, in order to have the cash flow to develop their new technology to a point where its potential is realized. We discuss this development, and how we model it, in Section III.
In Section IV we analyze various demand contexts. In our first set of runs, there are strong band wagon effects, customers are locked into their old suppliers, and the new firms that try to introduce the new technology don't have a chance. Then we do a set of runs in which there is little bandwagon holding customers to their old suppliers, but the customers are very sophisticated, and won't buy a new model computer unless it is as good as or better than the old model ones. Again, this effectively blocks the new firms whose products, at the early stages, are not as good as the old computers. Our purpose is to show the difficulties that new products or great promise but requiring considerable work to achieve that promise have in cracking into a market in competition with refined older generation products, unless there are some customers who for some reason find the new products attractive, even in their imperfect state.
In our next sets of runs we introduce such customers. In the first new set, there is a group of customers who have a policy of experimenting. They will buy some of the products based on the new technology, simply because they are new, and will not be deterred from that experimentation simply because the quality of the new products is not up to that which they had been buying. In the second set of runs, there is a group of customers with very different tastes than the customers who had been buying the old products, whose needs, however, can be met with the new technology. In both cases, the new firms, and the new technology, is able to get a foothold in the industry.
In these cases, the experimental users, or the niche market, serve as an incubator for the new technology. After a time, computers using the new technology are able to compete with traditional computers on the regular market. Given their latent superiority, they soon take over that market.
The Basic Model and Product Life Cycle Dynamics
In this section we lay out the basic model. Given the nature of complex simulation models, it is impossible to present all the details of all the equations, without befuddling the reader and obscuring the basic logic.We have tried, therefore, to lay out in transparent form what we regard as the gist.
Interested readers may obtain a full copy of the simulation model by writing to the first named author.
We start by considering the situation when a new product has just been invented. That product has the potential to get sales in a market, but it has to be developed and perfected before it can actually meet the potential market demand. Moreover, the current conception of the product and the technology it embodies has inherent limits.
To make the discussion concrete, let the product be the first generation of electronic computers.
The potential purchasers of computers value two attributes. One is the "performance" of the computer. The other is its price, or "cheapness." The desirability of any computer design can be summarized in terms of how it rates in those two dimensions of Lancaster attribute space. By a useful product we mean one that meets threshold requirements of potential purchasers. More on this shortly.
The innate characteristics of product designs of this first generation limit what products can achieve in these two dimensions, even when those designs are perfected. For analytic convenience, we treat these technological constraints as defining a rectangular box. Thus in Figure I the outer boundaries of the box mark the set of technological characteristics that potentially can be achieved by products of this first generation. These outer limits of what is feasible under the current technology are "potentials." The potential is not achievable, however, without significant investment of resources in research and development, and requires learning from experience. The first efforts of a new firm trying to design a product will only be able to achieve a design characterized by point Z (for zero experience). We will specify the dynamics of design improvement built into the model in Section 3.2.
The Market
Later in this essay we will consider a market that consists of different subgroups of potential customers who value the two product attributes--cheapness and performance--differently. For the present we consider only one group of potential customers who have the same preferences. Before members of this group can be induced to buy any products at all, a product offered to them must meet certain threshold requirements. Once these threshold requirements are met, the value that customers place on a product is an increasing function of its cheapness and performance. In Figure   III we depict the preferences of the customers that can be induced to buy some of these first generation products, if they are good enough.
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The "indifference curves" of Figure II depict designs of equal value or "merit" in the eyes of customers. Product designs whose characteristics fall outside the box, that is that do not meet threshold requirements, have a merit of zero. We shall develop the details of market behavior in Section 2.3 For the time being, let us just note that we assume that higher product merit translates into more products bought by customers.
Supply Dynamics
In our model, firms gradually develop competence in using the new technology as a result of the R-D investments they make, and the experience they accumulate. Our model of firm learning is meant to capture significant elements of the "dynamic competence" theory of the firm that has been developed by Winter (1987) , Dosi and Marengo (1993) , and Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1992, 1996) .
Our model also incorporates the fact that in this industry, and in a number of others, a considerable period may go by after a firm starts trying to operate in a new technology before it is able to sell any product, if it ever achieves that. At the start it must have external financing.
Thus at the beginning of our episode, we assume that there are a number of firms, each endowed by "venture capitalists" with an initial budget to spend on R-D, who hope to exploit the new technological opportunities. All firms start with the same initial design capabilities, depicted by Z in Design outcomes are influenced by firm-specific strategies represented by choices of search direction in the capabilities space. In our model these strategies are reflected in randomly selected trajectories of technological improvement along the two technological dimensions, price and performance. It is assumed that trajectories are firm-specific and time-invariant. Thus, after the initial period, the firms in the industry will be doing different things, and will be achieving product designs of different characteristics.
As firms spend down their initial loan doing R-D, from period to period the quality of the design that a company is able to achieve in each relevant dimension--performance and cheapness--improves according to the following equation:
The first variable, R, is the firm's R-D expenditure aimed at achieving design improvements of a particular sort, where I=1 denotes performance and I=2 denotes cheapness. This expenditure is a constant fraction of its period-by-period R-D expenditures in total.
The second variable in the equation, L i -X i , is distance of the achieved design to the frontier. As what is achieved comes closer and closer to the limits of what is achievable, a given R-D expenditure will achieve less and less further progress. The third variable T is the experience of a firm in a specific technology (in this model either old or new).
As indicated, if a firm runs through its initial loan before it achieves a marketable product, it simply fails. However, if a firm manages to push its design into the region where customers are buying, it is a new ball game. Now funds from revenues can be invested in R-D.
Profits, π are calculated in each period t as:
where M is the number of products sold, p is the product price and k is unit production cost, which in turn is the inverse of the computer "cheapness" achieved by a firm. Price is obtained by adding a mark-up, µ , to costs:
The mark-up, µ, is initially set equal for all firms , but subsequently can vary over time as a function of the market share that has been achieved. In particular, we assume that as firms gain monopoly power, they (partly) exploit it by charging a higher mark-up. Specifically.
where η is the elasticity of demand and m is the firm's market share.
The gross margin over production costs is used to cover several things. Firms spend a constant fraction σ (15% for all firms in this version of the model) of their profits in each period to pay back their debt D t to investors -that is to say, the initial budget capitalized at the current interest rate, r, until the debt has been fully paid back. What is left of the initial loan in each period is reinvested in R-D. R-D expenditure, R t, is determined as a constant fraction, φ , of what is left of gross profits, π t , after the repayment of the initial budget 5) R t, = φ * π t (1-σ)
In this version of the model this fraction is the same for all firms and constant over time.
The excess gross profits after debt repayment and R-D expenditures is invested in an account, B t , that yields the interest rate, r, in each period. and is treated in this model as "reserves." These reserves will enter the model in an important way when we shall examine the case of a new technology becoming available as an alternative component technology.
Demand Dynamics
The overall market consists of a number of potential customers or customer collectives (like a firm) each of which can be thought of as a different customer. Each potential customer can be thought of as shopping around at any time, and homing in on a particular product as a candidate for purchase. They are drawn to a particular product by their assessment of its "merit", which is a Cobb Douglas function of its two valued attributes, performance and cheapness, each attribute measured from its threshold value:
However, customers do not have perfect ex-ante information about the merits of the available products, so they have to make their choices on the basis of fragmentary information.. They have limited access to some direct indicators of merit (for example engineering reports, and testimony of people they know who have bought a computer). They also use the success of a product in attracting other customers more generally as a clue. In particular, the larger the share of the market that a product already holds, the greater the likelihood that a customer will consider that product. Thus a bandwagon effect is built into this model. The particular rationale invoked here is that use by others provides an indication that the product has relatively high merit, but there may be other reasons as well why a potential customer might be attracted to brands that are selling well.
Putting these two variables together, the probability that any customer will consider a particular product for purchase in a particular period is:
c is specified so that in any period the sum of the probabilities adds to one. As noted, M denotes the "merit" of a product. "m" is the market share, in terms of the fraction of total sales revenues accounted for by that product. The exponents ds and bw denote the strength of design sensitivity and bandwagon respectively in influencing the computer a customer will buy. We note that the market share variable can be interpreted either in terms of a bandwagon effect, or a (probabilistic) lock-in of customers who previously had bought machines of a particular brand. The "d 1 " assures that products that have just broken into the market, and have no prior sales, can attract some sale
Above we proposed that the logic of our model implies that the greater the merit of a product, the more of that product should be sold to customers who are looking at it. We now adopt the simple assumption that a potential customer who is considering a particular product of merit M, will buy M units of that product. If the notion of a single customer buying many products is bothersome to the reader, think of the customer as a large organization, or a collection of smaller ones or individuals.
Thus if there are N customer or customer groups on the market, the expected amount of sales of a product of merit M will be (8) Expected number of sales = N.P.M Note the following. First, if there is only one product that meets threshold requirements, each sub market of customer will buy it with probability 1, and will buy "M" units of it. Second, if there is more than one product that passes the threshold, then if "ds" is very high, and "bw" is very low, virtually all the customers will buy the product with the highest merit score. On the other hand, if "ds" is relatively low, or "bw" is high, a higher merit product design may be "out sold" by a rival product that has the higher existing market share.
A Product Life Cycle
In this model either a strong bandwagon effect (a large bw in equation 7) or strong customer sensitivity to the relative Merits of different computers available for purchase (a large ds in equation 7) will lead relatively quickly to a highly concentrated industry structure. Figure 3 shows the time path of the Herfindahl concentration index for three sets of runs. (Each parameter set was run 100
times, and the line depicts what happened on average). In one of the parameter settings both bw and ds were small (ds = 1, bw =1). Because the first firm to achieve threshold merit has a temporary monopoly, there is a short period where the Herfindahl is close to one, but that monopoly does not last long. A durable dominant firm does not emerge. In the other two settings either bw or ds was large, and a dominant firm does emerge. (In one set ds = 4 and bw = 1, and in the other ds = 1 and
In what we will call the "high bandwagon" parameter settings, a firm that gets customers early holds on to them and attracts more customers because of the bandwagon, earns profits, plows these back into R and D, achieves advances in the Merit of its products and as a result increases sales per customer, hence tends to increase market share, etc. In what we call the "strong design sensitivity case", while a firm has no lock on its existing customers, if it gets a head start and a market ahead of its rivals, and plows back its profits to advance the Merit of its computers, it holds its existing customers because of its superior product, and attracts new ones. And with a higher M, it sells more to each customer.
This process is partially damped by the onset of diminishing returns to R-D towards the end of the runs. As the best products get close to the boundaries, their rate of technological advance slows down and laggards begin to catch up. However, in the "high bandwagon" case, the lock in of existing customers shelters the dominant firm from the increased technological competitiveness of rival products and concentration remains high. On the other hand, the dominant firm is more vulnerable to its rivals catching up in the "strong design sensitivity" case and its market power tends to erode somewhat.
The Emergence of a New Product Design
Let us now introduce a new feature into the basic model. Assume that at a certain time t* a new technology emerges, which opens a "second generation" of product designs. The new technology is potentially superior to the old one in the sense that it allows , in principle, the design of products that are better than "first generation" ones regarding both characteristics, performance, and cheapness.
In other words, as shown in Fig. 4 As with the old technology, however, the new product designs have to be developed and perfected.
The introduction of the new technology is associated to the entry of new firms. A number of new firms start out at point "Z" in Figure 4 , with funding provided by venture capitalists, just as earlier new firms had started out at that point using the old technology. Some of these firms will fail before they get into a market. Others may succeed.
However, the existence of established firms in the market creates a significant barrier to entry.
First of all, if a "new generation" firm achieves a design that meets threshold requirements in the market, that product is in competition with existing products that already have achieved higher than threshold quality levels. Second, the established firms have acquired positive market share which, in itself, attracts and holds the attention of customers, and makes it hard for new products to be seen.. It clearly is difficult in this context for a new firm to survive, even if it succeeds in cracking into the market at small scale. If new firms can't survive, and if extant firms cannot or do not switch over to making product designs using the new technology, the potential afforded by the new technology never will be realized.
In the model, extant firms who have been using the old technology have the capability to switch over to the new, but it is costly to do so, and unless pressed by new firms the motivation may be weak. We make the probability that an established firm will adopt the new technology a function of two variables. One is the ratio of the Merit achieved by the best of the new generation products to the Merit of the old products a firm is producing. The second is the market share of the largest of the new firms.
The role of experimental users and users with different preferences.
The new technology comes into existence in period 30 and some of the new firms achieve computers that reach threshold requirements about period 70. In this section we consider, first, what happens if this event happens in the market context described in Section 3. Then we change that context to include a group of customers who like to experiment with new technologies. Finally, we introduce a niche market.
Blockaded entry
In the runs with parameter setting we have called "high bandwagon" , the new firms soon fail, and there is lttle pressure for established firms to adopt the new technology. The old dominant firm remains dominant. All this is depicted in Figure 5A .
This result stems first of all, from the cumulativeness of technical advance coupled with strong bandwagon effects on the demand side built into these runs. As a result, incumbents have such a large market share and demand is so locked in to existing technologies that the new technology cannot take off. New firms spending down their initial loans can achieve product designs that meet threshold requirements, but do not survive for long in the market where they are competing with established firms offering polished first generation products and a loyal group of customers.
Thus the new technology does not develop enough to make it competitive and, as a consequence, incumbents do not feel any pressure to adopt the new technology.
Figure 5B shows the same pattern for the runs with the parameter settings we have called "strong design sensitivity". Even while in these settings the bandwagon is weak, the customers are highly sophisticated, and prefer to buy the products with the most advanced design. The new technology has high potential but starts from a lower level of Merit than the best of the old generation computers, and it is not chosen by sophisticated customers. Thus, new entrants do not survive and the new technology does not have the opportunity to develop. The established leaders are not threatened by the new firms and do not adopt the new technology.
Experimental users
The fact that the new technology never has a chance to get going in the runs above means that, in the long run, computer customers are worse off than they might have been. If customers of computers had a long time horizon and could see the future under various scenarios, and if they had the capability for collective action, then they might somehow assure that the new technology had a chance to grow up. Indeed, "supporting the development of infant technologies" often is used as a rational for active government support. However, our focus in this paper is not on technology policies, but on market mechanisms that in many cases have enabled second generation technologies to receive sufficient support to grow up, despite the presence of a dominant firm providing a polished product using an older technology.
One such mechanism is the presence in the market of some users of the product who have a policy of buying and experimenting with new technologies. This generally is done in parallel with their purchase and use of more conventional products, so long as the latter are more cost-effective.
However, in our modeling, we will treat experimental users as separate entities.
In the next set of simulations, it is assumed that a set of experimental users exists who will buy products based on the new technology, simply because they are new, and will not be deterred from that experimentation simply because the quality of the new products is not up to that which they had been buying. Figures 6A and 6B show the runs with "strong bandwagon" and "high design sensitivity" respectively. In these runs we have set three levels of experimental users: 10% of the total, 20%, and 30%.
In each of these runs the new technology takes off, first through the sales of the new entrants and later, induced by the success of the new firms, through the adoption of the new technology by established firms. When experimental users comprise 10% of the market, the new entrants are allowed to survive for a while. They will develop the new technology enough to trigger the industry leader to adopt it. After adoption, the dominant firm reinforces its advantage and shake-out occurs, with the new firms exiting the market. Where the experimental uses account for 20% or 30% of the market, the new firms with the new technology not only survive briefly, but also are able to establish and hold a non-trivial position in the market.
Diverse Preferences, and the Presence of a Niche Market
A second route through which new technology which is potentially superior to the old, but which requires considerable work before its potential is realized, gets brought to the market is through incubation in a separate market. Thus we introduce a second group of potential customers, a group that greatly values cheapness (see Figure 7) . Without the new technology, first generation products could not achieve the threshold demands of this second group, and they were left out in the cold, as it were. On the other hand, with second generation technology, products that meet this group's threshold demands can be provided. Some of the new firms that aim for the main market are able to achieve products with positive M around period 70. However, forced to compete with polished products based on the older technology, they quickly fail. In the runs of figure 8A they are defeated by established firms through lock in and bandwagon effects. The same occurs in the runs of figure 8B: while there is no lock in, sophisticated customers stick with products based on the old technology because these products are better. In neither case do the new firms pick up enough market early on so that they can survive in the main market to develop better products.
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On the other hand, the new firms that aimed for the niche market are able to do well there, since they initially face no competition from the old firms. (What happens on the niche market is not shown in the figures). After they have entered the niche market, based on niche market profits some of them are able to develop new products that are sufficiently good to compete on the main market as well as the fringe market. This is so when new products reach and pass the performance threshold required by the main market. We call it the "convergence case". In the convergence case the wave of entry of such firms into the main market from the niche market occurs somewhat later than the entry into the main market of the new firms that aimed directly for that market. But in contrast with those firms, the firms that enter indirectly do well, because they had the time to develop and improve their products and technologies.
As a consequence, the old dominant firm is forced to switch over to the new technology.
However, because the new firms are large by then and have a strong product, based on their success in the niche market, the old dominant firm is not able to eliminate them. Rather, as the new type of products take over the old market, the new firms become dominant and the Herfindahl index falls significantly.
Conclusions
The history of a number of industries is marked by a succession of eras, with different eras associated with different dominant technologies. Within any era, industry concentration tends to grow, because of dynamic economies of scale on both the supply side and the demand side.
Particular eras are broken by the introduction of a new technology which, while initially inferior to the established one in the prominent uses, has the potential to become competitive. In many cases new entrants rather than the established firms are the vehicles through which the new technology is introduced. Very often the large established firms do not make the transition, and if the new technology takes hold sooner or later they are replaced by new firms. In other cases the established firms of the old era are able to switch over effectively, and compete in the new era. In either case, the process of concentration begins again, until it is broken again by the advent of a new technology.
This paper has explored a model which generates this pattern. The focus of our analysis has been on the characteristics of the demand for the products of the industry. We have argued that the ability of the new firms exploring the new technology to survive long enough to get that technology effectively launched depends on the existence of fringe markets which the old technology does not serve well, or experimental users, or both. Established firms initially have little incentive to adopt the new technology, which initially is inferior to the technology they have mastered. New firms generally cannot survive in head-to-head conflict with established firms on the market well served by the latter. The new firms need to find a market that keeps them alive long enough so that they can develop the new technology to a point where it is competitive on the main market. Niche markets, or experimental users, can provide that space.
The stimulus for this analysis has come from our research on the computer industry, and we believe the model fits very well there. But there are many other industries where this analysis also seems to apply.
Thus, when transistors were first introduced as a potential substitute for vacuum tubes, in most uses they were inferior. However, the Department of Defense recognized the potential advantages of transistors in several of the weapons systems it was contemplating. The Department of Defense thus provided a special market for transistors, and companies selling almost exclusively to that specialized market were able to survive and advance transistor technology to a point where it could compete effectively with vacuum tubes in a wide range of civilian uses. After some years, transistors had virtually eliminated vacuum tubes from those markets.
The Department of Defense also provided a (large) niche market that induced the development of aircraft jet engines. Without that specialized market, it is likely that jet engine technology would have developed much more slowly. As it happened, supported initially by defense demand, jet engine technology rapidly advanced and relatively quickly replaced piston engines on the civilian aircraft market.
A recent study on the development of intraocular lenses as a technology for effectively solving the cataract problem documents the considerable period of time when those lenses, and the surgery needed to implant them, were considered by many ophthalmologists to be inferior to other means of treating cataracts, and for many patients, that probably was the case. The persistence of a group of ophthalmologists who had faith in intraocular lenses, and their ability to convince a number of patients that this was the best treatment for them, provided a market and a testing ground for the development of intraocular lenses to the point where they became very effective, and the surgery safe and more or less routine. (Metcalfe J.S.-Andrew J.,2001), 20 As is well known, the early work which started progress toward the Internet was funded by the Department of Defense because of its own special needs. Those needs called for something like a packet switched network, as an alternative to a circuit switched network. As that technology developed, a new group of experimental users joined the market, principally academic researchers, who used ARPANET to connect research laboratories. As a result of further development, the Internet became a technology capable of attracting a large market of users.
The Internet case is not so much one of a new technology replacing an older one in a given market, but rather one in which an initial niche market, and a group of experimental users, enabled a new technology to survive and advance to the point where it could tap a major new market. There are many examples of important new technologies that developed this way. Thus, the market for automobiles was initially almost exclusively a market made up of sportsmen, and experimenters.
The same is true for the market for early aircraft.
Scholars of technological change have not ignored demand. Indeed they long have seen the size and structure of demand as important factors influencing the magnitude and orientation of inventive effort. Scholars concerned with the factors influencing industry structure also have paid attention to the structure of demand, the sensitivity of customers to advertising, and the strength bandwagon and network effects, in determining whether or not the industry gets concentrated (see in particular John Sutton, 1991 and 1998) .
The focus on the demand side in this paper has been different than in either of these research traditions, but is in some cases strongly complementary. The argument has been that the presence of markets not well served by incumbent firms, and of experimental users, often has been an important factors permitting new technologies to effectively enter a field, and that when new technologies enter these submarkets through new firms, this can have a profound, long-run effect on industry structure. We think that this has been an important phenomenon in the history of a number of industries, and deserves more attention from economists than it thus far has been given.
